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A B S T R A C T  
When mathematics is used to help people cope with real-life situations, a three-stage 
intellectual process is involved. First, a person becomes aware of a problem-situation 
which stimulates him to generate a problem-statement, a verbal story-problem. This may 
be in writing, expressed orally, or merely thought and evidenced by other behavior. 
Second, he transforms the verbal problem-statement into a mathematical formulation. 
Third, he analyzes this mathematically stated problem into subproblems to which the 
solution is more immediate. 
We propose an operational instrument for assessing how a person moves from the 
first to the second and third stage. This involves coding questions asked, actions taken, 
hesitancy and latency. Results of using this procedure in experimental situations were 
used to determine reliability. We also propose and compare methods for effecting and 
accelerating motion from the first to the third stage. These involve operant conditioning, 
need arousal cues, controlled verbal instructions. Experience with one such technique to 
teach problem-formulation in actual teaching practice is reported. 
The theoretical basis for these experiments is developed by showing how to 
program a computer to go through these stages for a reasonably large and interesting class 
of problem-situations to which mathematics is applicable. 
1. I n t r o d u c t i o n  
Formulating a mathematical "s tory-problem" is more difficult than 
solving one already formulated mathematically. It is difficult because it 
involves recognizing a problem that needs formulation and which arises 
naturally in a person's daily activities as one that resembles a mathematical 
story-problem. A mathematical story problem is a verbal problem such as: 
"Drove 3 hours. Average speed 65 mph. Then drove 3 more hours. Average 
speed 55 mph. Traveled how far?' (Eichholz and D'Affer, 1964). 
This same problem could arise as a real world activity in the following 
* This research was partially supported by an Office of Education Grant O E G 5 - 7 2 -  
0050(509). 
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situation: A person in Houston learns at 2 p.m. that a certain event 
important  to him (the Mardi Gras) will start in Nev7 Orleans at 8 p.m. that 
evening. He could drive, if he thinks he can make it. He must now formulate 
the problem for himself. He may learn, by asking questions, that the distance 
is 385 miles, that he can average 65 mph for the first 195 miles, and 55 mph 
for the rest. 
Research on problem-solving has focussed primarily on processes by 
which a person (or computer-program) can and does pass from a prefor- 
mulated problem to a solution. In this paper, we propose to study the 
process of  initially recognizing and attaining a verbal formulation of a 
problem. We conceptualize this process with the help of  what we call 
representation theory. We report the results of  a pilot experiment using a 
novel instrument for assessing problem-recognition and formulation perfor- 
mance and a technique for improving it. 
IMPORTANCE OF PROBLEM-FORMULATION 
From kindergarten to graduate school we train people primarily to 
solve well-defined problems that were posed and presented to them. Scien- 
tists and engineers are taught in school to solve such preformulated 
problems. Only from their professional experience do they learn to recognize 
and formulate real problems on their own. 
We believe that because of  the immensity of  problems that we face but  
have not  recognized or properly formulated, it is imperative that formal 
education does not  wait until the "scientist" becomes a "professional" in 
problem-solving before he gets his training in the recognition and formula- 
tion of  problems. To accomplish such a shift in training priorities, we need a 
better  understanding of  how one can and does recognize and formulate a real 
problem. 
A few leaders (Wilcox, 1973) are beginning to recognize that the 
separation of  research and education from real problems of  contemporary 
relevance has become too great. Mathematics, for example, has been likened 
to chess; and "the world hardly has time to play chess anymore."  
BACKGROUND 
Gestalt and organization theories (Tulving and Donaldson, 1972; 
K6hler, 1926) are concerned with how, for example, a chimpanzee 1 acquires 
the "insight" to join 2 poles for reaching a banana that is beyond the reach 
1 In a recent TV documentary, a rather impressive and similar experiment with macaques 
was performed in which one of the monkeys discovered that by pulling a string to which 
an orange was suspended, the fruit could be obtained. 
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of  one pole. Psycholinguistic and information processing theories (Carroll and 
Freedle, 1972) on the other hand try to account  for how people obey 
verbally stated commands, such as "Invert  the match-stick s k e t c h  1"~1 of  the 
I 
cocktail glass so that the olive is outside by moving just  2 sticks" or 
substitute numerals for letters in SAM+JIM=BILL". Organizational theories 
dealt primarily with episodic memories (Tulving, 1972) which receive and 
store information about  dated episodes and temporal relations between 
them. Psycholinguistics theories deal mainly with semantic memories, such 
as thesauri, which are necessary for the use of  language. To ou r  knowledge 
there has been no extension of  these theories beyond concern with memory  
to processing, and to synthesize episodic and semantic approaches. Only the 
work on "representation theory ''2 (Kochen, 1960a, b, 1964, 1971 ; Kochen 
and Badre, 1974; Badre, 1973, 1974; Uhr and Kochen, 1965, 1969) has 
addressed itself to problems like the one faced by the traveler from Houston 
to New Orleans, that requires recognition and verbal formulation. 
In brief, representation theory is concerned with how a learner repre- 
sents his environment so that he can recognize and cope with an increasing 
variety of  opportunit ies and traps that present themselves. This differs 
greatly from the concern of  researchers in artificial intelligence (Amarel, 
1971; Simon and Siklossy, 1972) with how to represent well-defined 
problems to a computer  so it can solve them. 
SPECIFIC PURPOSE 
In this paper we pose the problem-formulation question in terms of  
problems requiring mathematics. We specialize representation theory to 
environments that generate tasks requiring mathematical formulations in 
order to develop the theory in the direction of  making it more testable. We 
report  an experimental technique of  testing or assessing whether a problem 
has been recognized and formulated; it uses questions asked by a subject as 
the basic data (Kochen and Badre, 1974). We extend to theory to suggest 
how a computer  program could generate questions in a problem-formulation 
environment. We also report  a technique for improving the performance of  
children in grades 4 and 5 on tasks requiring them to recognize and 
formulate problems; it resembles the game "Twenty  Questions". 
2 There is more on representation problems in the computer science literature, notably 
by Amarel, and Newell, as well as in the management science literature. The closest work 
in psychology are models developed by Restle, Bower, and Trabasso based on ideas of 
Bruner. 
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The  cent ra l  po in t  is an e x p e r i m e n t a l  ver i f ica t ion  o f  the  hypo thes i s  tha t  
a large p o p u l a t i o n  of  chi ldren can be taught  to i m p r o v e  in recognizing and 
descr ibing s o m e  real s i tua t ions  as ones requir ing p r o b l e m - s t a t e m e n t s  which  
r e semble  s t o r y - p r o b l e m s  in a r i t hme t i c  texts  used in grades 4 and 5. In o the r  
words ,  there  exists  an e n v i r o n m e n t  tha t  s t imula tes  the f o r m a t i o n  o f  in terna l  
p r o b l e m - s t a t e m e n t s  ( h y p o t h e s e s )  which  mani fes t s  i tself  as observable  
quest ions .  
2. Question-Generation 
I m p r o v e d  inqui ry  modes  can i m prove  p rob lem-recogn i t ion .  T o  m a k e  
this m o r e  precise,  we ask h o w  we would  p r o g r a m  a c o m p u t e r  to recognize  
p r o b l e m s  and to  ask quest ions.  C o m p l e t e  r igor  would  d e m a n d  a ve ry  leng thy  
expos i t ion .  Hence  we on ly  ske tch  some  central  ideas .  
T o  start ,  we have to  spec i fy  the inpu t  to  L, the p rogram.  This  inpu t  is 
to  mir ror ,  for  example ,  the physica l  s t imul i  3 which  m o t i v a t e d  the t raveler  in 
H o u s t o n  to be  conce rned  a b o u t  w h e t h e r  he could  drive to New Orleans in 6 
hours ;  t hey  are also answers to  quest ions.  T h e n  we m u s t  spec i fy  the ou tpu t ,  
which  is ma in ly  ques t ions  such as " H o w  do I drive f r o m  H o u s t o n  to New 
Or leans?"  and act ions such as driving. We m u s t  also ske tch  wha t  L has in 
s torage 4 pr ior  to  input ,  and the general  out l ine  o f  the  a lgor i thm accord ing  to 
which  it  processes  the inpu ts  and generates  ou tpu t s .  
I n p u t  to L." This is a s ta te  s o f  L ' s  env i ronmen t .  Suppose  it  to  be a 
str ing o f  several variables,  s l ,  s ~ , . . . ,  each o f  which  ranges over  s o m e  
d imens ion  o f  s tate-space,  and varies wi th  t ime  t, measu red  in hours.  F o r  
s impl ic i ty  o f  expos i t ion ,  suppose  tha t  si(t)  is the  n a m e  o f  a t o w n  on the 
rou te  f r o m  H o u s t o n  to N e w  Orleans  (or  ~b to  deno t e  no  t o w n )  where  L migh t  
be t hours  a f t e r  L lef t  Hous ton .  T h a t  is, Sl ranges over  all the t o w n - n a m e s  
along the route .  Init ial ly,  Sl (0) = Hous ton .  The  s ta te  Sl ( t )  = N e w  Orleans 
wi th  t <_ 6 is the  on ly  reward  state.  Let  s2( t )  be an answer  to  the last  
ques t ion  L asked pr ior  to  t. Le t  s~ (t)  be an e x t r a n e o u s  ins t ruc t ion ,  verbal  
3 The distinction between problems created by the real world and problem-statements 
presented by an experimenter, computer-user, teacher or textbook authors seems 
obvious to us. Those who view a verbal statement of a real-world problem as merely a 
surrogate or another version of the problem should consider the difference between 
problems faced by the doctor in the clinic, the business manager in the field or the lawyer 
in court, in contrast to their facing textbook versions of these problems. 
4 We do not mean to insist on a model which assumes a central role for a passive kind of 
memory in which rules, hypotheses Or other items are stored until retrieved for use. We 
do assume a store of programs that can generate hypotheses as needed as well as selected 
hypotheses, plus programs that generate other programs. (Farnham-Diggory, 1972). 
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stimulus or datum, a question to be initiated. This ranges over a specified set 
of sentences. 
Output o f  L." This is an action a, from L to the environment. Suppose it 
to be a string of  several variables, al, a 2 , . . . .  In this case let a~ (t) denote 
the imagined speed (mph), say - 9 0  to 90, where a negative number means 
heading back to Houston. Another  output  variable is the decision: 
a2 (t) = 
I drive to New Orleans 
don' t  drive 
defer decision. 
Yet another variable is aa(t) which ranges over the set of  possible questions 
L could ask. 
In Storage Prior to Input: This includes a production system for 
questions and answers. Formally, this is specified by a terminal vocabulary, 
V T e.g. {Houston, how, far, from), a non-terminal vocabulary VN, two 
special symbols used to start generation of questions (Q) and answers (A), a 
set of  rewrite rules R. L also has, in storage, a list of rules for recognizing 
(parsing) answer sentences and for translating them into an internal represen- 
tation (Kochen, 1969). Most importantly,  L has in storage a set of  hypothe- 
ses. These are statements in an internal representation exemplified by: H1 = 
"For  all t, if Sl (t) = Houston and al (0) = 40 mph, then sl 0+1) = Austin; 
weight .8, saliency 1", and H2 = " I f  sl (t) --- New Orleans and t = time the 
Mardi Gras in New Orleans starts, value is high; weight 1, saliency 1" 
Some hypotheses, such as " I f  I go faster than 90 mph, I am likely to 
cause an accident or receive a fine, both of which I dislike more than I like 
speeding. Weight = 1, Saliency = 0," are stored in long-term memory. Other 
hypotheses, such as H1 and H2 may be in L's short-term memory for the few 
seconds or minutes in which he is recognizing the problem and making a 
decision. All the hypotheses in short-term memory (STM) have high saliency. 
Algorithm." The main function of L is to select outputs which maximize 
the expected value of a future state. First L registers the input by parsing 
and translating it if it is a sentence s , classifying it if it is not. s The initial 
input in the above example might be: sl (0) = Houston s3 (0) = "The Mardi 
Gras starts in New Orleans at t = 6". This input is classified as an oppor- 
tunity-state by matching the phrases "Mardi Gras starts" and "New Orleans" 
in a stored hypothesis such as H2, which has a high value. If L could not  
s This may be the answer to a question, a question or instruction by an experimenter in 
an experimental situation. 
6 Physical stimuli such as audio visual signals signifying to L that "he" is in Houston. 
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parse an input sentence or if  the sentence has a word not  in VT, L generates 
a stylized question: "What does - -  mean?".  It processes the answer 
by forming new hypotheses and adding them to the store. 
Secondly, L searches its store 7 for useful hypotheses. A useful hypothe- 
sis is one that helps L choose and attain a valued "goal"-state. It selects these 
from short-term memory with a probability proportional to the weights of 
the hypotheses in STM. Both H1 and H2 might be retrieved in the above 
example because H1 shares with the input the term "Houston" ,  and H2 
shares "New Orleans". Ideally, L would like to find, besides H2, an hypothe- 
sis like " I f  sl (0) = Houston and al (0) = 80, then s(t) = New Orleans for some 
t << 6". I f  that is present, the output  is: the decision, a2 (0) = "drive to New 
Orleans"; a~ (0) = 80 mph; and a3 (0) = no further questions. The environ- 
ment now responds and the interaction continues. During the short time 
interval, ( - 2xt, 0) that  decision a2 (0) is made, a "within-representation high 
saliency shif t"  (Badre, 1973) may have occurred in that the weight of  a 
hypothesis containing a2 = "don ' t  drive" has increased while the weight of  
an hypothesis containing a2 -- "drive to New Orleans" has decreased. 
If  such an hypothesis is not there, L forms an hypothesis of the form: 
"(At) (AT) (Ay) (Ax) (Av), if  s~ (t) = x and a~ (t) = v then s~ (t+T) = y, 
where the distance from x to y is v. T. ,,8 Once L has formed this hypothesis 
- particularly the italicised phrase - he has recognized and formulated the 
mathematical problem which must be posed and solved for L to make a 
rational decision. We must now sketch how L might generate evidence of this 
by asking questions. The implied questions are: "What towns are between 
Houston and New Orleans?" (formally, what is x such that, for 0 < t < 6, 
sl (t) = x). "What is the maximum speed between towns x and y ? "  (What is v 
such that al (t) <v?) "What is the distance from x to y ? "  etc. When enough 
such questions are posed, L shoutd be able to synthesize them into a decision 
a2 (0). After observing all these questions as output,  we infer that L has 
formulated the problem. 
But how can L form such an hypothesis involving a product (and 
perhaps a sum, vl - T ~ +  v2 " T2 + . . . ) ?  We assume that multiplication (.) 
and addition (+) is in VT, and that there are in storage general hypotheses of  
the form: "(Av) (An). If  1 unit of a property 1 is associated with v units of  
property 2, and n units of  property 1 are chosen, then the n units are 
associated with n • v units of property 2". Such a general hypothesis is 
specialized, with the help of hypotheses that constitute a thesaurus which 
has entries such as "Time is a property",  "Distance is a property",  "Hour  is a 
unit" ,  "Mile is a unit".  The specialized hypothesis now is: "(Av) (An). If  1 
7 A p ro g ram  for  this  has  been  i m p l e m e n t e d  in SNOBOL4.  
8 In words ,  " I f  I drive at v m p h  f rom town  x to t o w n  y in T hours ,  t he n  I will t ravel  v • T 
miles f r o m  x to  y ;  this  s t a t e m e n t  holds  for any  v, T, x, y and  any  s ta r t ing  t ime.  
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hour of  time is associated with v miles of  distance, and n hours are chosen, 
then the n miles are associated with n • v miles of  distance". 
Where does the general hypothesis come from? Like all other hypothe- 
ses, it may be direct verbal input that is simply recorded; or it may be 
formed by imitating types of  questions asked by another L which reflected 
the use of  such hypotheses.  It may also be the result of  induction and 
generalization from other hypotheses in memory  that is the heart of  the 
algorithms in representation theory. 
It  follows that an environment which provides inputs, such as questions 
reflecting hypothesis-formation processes to be imitated, can produce in L 
the formation o f  general hypotheses, and, from these, the formation o f  
hypotheses that indicate recognition and partial formulation o f  a problem. A 
structured version o f  "Twenty Questions" may be such an environment. I t  is 
this hypothesis we test with a controlled experiment. 
If  L is in an environment which stimulates question-asking, such as the 
above, L should enrich its memory  with general hypotheses.  More specifical- 
ly, if  the environment includes conversation, graphics and instrumental tasks 
involving geometry,  arithmetic and algebra, we should obtain increased speed 
in performance on test tasks in these topics, if  such hypotheses  are useful. If  
representations that include such hypotheses are not  formed or relevant, no 
improvement  on the test tasks would be expected. It follows that if  there is 
improvement,  then the hypotheses  have been formed. 
3. Experiment 
HYPOTHESIS 
The first question of  interest to us was: does the technique we specify 
for improving problem-recognition and formulation behavior work? We 
chose a simple experimental design to test this technique. We selected a 
random group of  subjects, exposed half of  them to our procedure and let the 
other  half continue their exposure to the ongoing classroom methods of  
learning mathematical problem-formulation and then compared the differ- 
ence. 
More precisely, let T (for treatment) denote the set of  subjects who 
were exposed to our procedure and C (for control) that set of  subjects who 
were not. Let X T and X c denote the corresponding test scores for randomly 
chosen subjects from T and C. The null hypothesis is that the expected 
values, EXc. and E X  r are equal. 
Let H be the time it takes a subject to form useful hypotheses  when 
called for by a problem-situation either because he formed a general hypoth- 
esis, an algorithm that forms hypotheses, or because such hypotheses  (or 
122 
programs to generate them) were previously formed and stored for rapid 
retrieval. Let Q be the time it takes a subject to pose questions, the answers 
to which are necessary in coping. It is also plausible to assume that H T = H c 
implies QT = Q c ,  other factors being the same. Finally, we assume the 
implication: QT = Q c - ~ X T  = X c .  Therefore, X T C X c ~ Q T C Q c ~ H T C H c  -~ 
E T C E  c. If the subject exposed to T gets a lower test score (faster problem- 
recognition and formulation) X T than does an otherwise equal subject not  so 
exposed then it takes the subject exposed to T less time to form useful 
hypotheses than the subject not  so exposed, according to the above assump- 
tion. 
SUBJECTS 
The population about  which we wish to generalize consists of  children in 
grades 4 and 5 of  upper middle classe, predominantly white families in an 
American university city (Ann Arbor, Michigan). From a group of  thirty 4th 
and 5th graders, two equal groups of  10 each were randomly selected. 
IMPROVEMENT METHOD 
The experimental " t rea tment"  group underwent  6 days of  training 
sessions. Each session was one hour long. The main thrust of  these sessions 
was to get children to formulate mathematical story problems similar to the 
ones they encounter  in their mathematics texts (e.g. Eichholz and D'Affer). 
The children were specifically told that no at tempt must be made to solve 
formulated problems. The trainer considered her objective to have been met 
when each child had achieved the formulation of six such problems. 
In order to get the children into an °'inquiry" and "problem-asking and 
quizzing" frame of mind, the first session was devoted to playing 20 
questions, using various topics, e.g. cryptograms, hidden objects, guessing 
numbers, etc. The next session began with 20 questions about  story- 
problems in the text book. Next each child was asked to formulate ."for 
himself" a story problem similar to a specific one in the text book. The rest 
of  the children were to guess it by playing twenty  questions. 
The next session involved using concrete objects, to stimulate children 
how to formulate verbal problems. An example of  this was the use of  a scale 
and two cars being weighed. The trainer formulated the first problem: " I f  
the weight of  the big car + the weight of  the small car is equal to 94 grams, 
and the weight of the big car is equal to the weight of  small car + 24 grams, 
what is the weight of  the big car?". Then children were asked to formulate 
two different problems each using the same or different objects. 
The rest of  the sessions were conducted similarly. Real-life objects and 
situations such as "cus tomer  and shopkeeper" ,  "calculation", and '°rate 
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problems" were used. A pocket-size electronic calculator was used to do 
arithmetic at the children's request. This procedure continued until each 
child had formulated six story-problems. 
TESTING 
All 20 randomly selected children were tested 10 days after the training 
sessions with the experimental group of  10 children were started. Each child 
was tested individually for 30 minutes. Testing took 2 days. Like the training 
sessions, the tests took place on the premises of  the school to which all the 
children went, though not  in the same room. The testing procedure is 
detailed next. 
4. Assessment and Test Construction 
Before we can test the hypothesis that the ability to recognize and 
formulate certain problems improved, we must have a way of assessing that 
ability. To this end, we devised a three-way test, covering algebra, geometry, 
and arithmetic analysis, which are the traditional main divisions of  mathe- 
matics taught in grades 4 and 5. In each task, we were testing performance 9 
ability for recognizing a situation as one requiring certain mathematical 
operations, such as: (1) "multiplication of  a number of  items with property 
1 by a number of  items of  property 2 that are associated with one item of  
property 1 and adding"; (2) "multiplying the dimensions of  a rectangle or 
box to obtain its area or volume";  (3) "determinat ion of  a named but as yet  
non-explicit number, where that  name occurs in two statements that togeth- 
er determine its value". 
A description of the four-tasks test follows. 
SET-UP 
The subject entered the test room to find 4 tables, D 1, D2, D3, D4, and 
8 chairs. Each table had associated with it two chairs facing each other on 
either side of  it. The experimenter, E, sat in one chair facing the table. The 
subject, S, 1° sat in the other chair, facing E. In a different part of  the room, 
an observer-coder sat with a pen, a paper, and a stop-watch. 
D1 had on it: (a) a cardboard sheet 26" X 23"; (b) three cardboard 
9 As distinct from capacity, which would require a different measuring instrument and a 
different tabulation. 
lO This corresponds to what we called L (for learner) in Section 2. 
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houses on (a) labeled MacDonald's, School, and Bank; (c) the cardboard 
houses were placed on corners of (a) at three different intersections of three 
main roads (drawn on (a)); (d) three signs placed at the three different roads: 
Sign 1 read: "Speed Limit is 2 seconds per inch, distance to MacDonald's is 18 
inches"; Sign 2 read: "Speed Limit is 1 second per inch, distance to School is 
12 inches"; Sign 3 read: "Speed Limit is 3 seconds per inch"; (e) a car placed 
at upper right corner of  board. 
D2 had on it: (a) 5 boxes that ranged in volume from 260 to 630 cubic 
inches; (b) 360 1" polystyrene cubes. 
D3 had on it (a) three spools of  orange, white and black wire; (b) price 
tags - "White wire, 1 lc per inch", "Orange wire, 13c per inch", "Green 
wire° 7c per inch". 
D4 had on i t  (a) a 36" straight steel wire, ~ inch in diameter; (b) 80 
1 inch square cardboard tiles. 
TASKS 
The items on D1 were associated with Task 1, T1; D2 with T2, and D3 
with T3, and D4 with T4. There was a sign on each table which read: "Keep 
Asking Questions Until You Know What to Do". E told S that "this is a 
game that requires the use of some mathematics".  Then, he gave S instruc- 
tions that varied with each task. The instructions in every task began: "I 
would like you to make up questions for me to answer. The answer should 
make it possible for us: 
Task 1 - to figure out how long it takes a car traveling at maximum 
speed to get from where it is now to the Bank. 
Task 2 - to choose one of those boxes that will exactly fit those cubes 
as they are placed near and on top of each other in the box. 
Task 3 - to sell me some of  these wires. Now I am the customer and I 
want to order from you 10 inches of white wire, 12 inches of  orange wire, 
and 7 inches of green wire. 
Task 4 - to make a picture frame. The picture should be made up df  all 
these tiles inside the frame. The frame should be made with this wire and use 
up all the wire with nothing left over." 
After S was seated, E told S this was a game and that he had in mind 
four tasks involving the objects on the four desks. He instructed S to ask E 
any questions, which E promised to answer truthfully and which were to 
help S guess what task E had in mind. E then proceeded to answer the 
questions asked by S, responding to questions like "What am I supposed to 
do?"  with "That  is what you are to figure ou t , "  or to "In which box will all 
the cubes just f i t?" with "I can't tell you directly, but will answer another 
question that might help you to find out ."  This continued until either half 
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an hour was up or S had asked questions indicating that he had figured out  
the 4 tasks in a way that was equivalent to the following 4 statements: 
1. The time (in seconds) for the car to go from the start to the Bank is 
the speed allowed on the Start-MacDonald's stretch, in inches/second times 
the distance (in inches) of  that stretch plus the speed allowed on the 
MacDonald-School stretch times the length of  that stretch plus the speed 
allowed on the School-Bank stretch times the length of  that. 
2. The box I should pick if E gives me all his cubes and I want to just  
fill the box is one whose volume is equal to the number  of  cubes, and the 
volume (cube inches) is the product  of  the length, width and height of  a box 
(all in inches). 
3. The amount  of money I should get for delivering the order is the 
price of  the white wire, in cents per inch, the length of white wire I sold (in 
inches), plus the price of  the orange wire times the number  of inches of  
orange wire, plus the price of  the green wire times the amount of that. 
4. The picture frame we should bend this wire into is a rectangle with 
an area, in square inches, equal to the number o f  tiles if they are 1 inch 
squares and a perimeter equal to the length of  the wire; the length and width 
of the rectangle must be such that their product is the number of  tiles, and 
twice their sums is the length of  the wire. 
DATA COLLECTION 
The observer O recorded the time, to the nearest second, between the 
termination of  E's instruction or response to a question and the onset of  S's 
next question for each question asked or comment  made by S. E also 
recorded, for each question, whether it contained words on a checklist. For  
task 1, for example, the checklist contained such words as " t ime",  "speed",  
"times or multiplication", "length or distance", "plus or addition", etc. 
Near-synonyms were also checked. E also judged when S seemed to have 
asked a sequence of  questions that, in their totality, indicated that S has 
recognized and formulated a problem equivalent to statements 1 - 4. 
Data was recorded on two coding sheets for each subject, one for the 
time, one for the coding of  the questions. In addition, careful records of  
actual behavior and special questions, both during the training and the test 
sessions were kept. A sample of  these is given in the appendix. 
SCORING 
The score for a randomly chosen subject on the first task was a random 
variable we called X1 which was the stun of all the recorded inter-question 
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intervals for that subject on that task. Let )(2, X3, and X4 denote corre- 
sponding random variables for tasks 2, 3, and 4. The total score on the test 
was intended to be X1 + X2 + Xa + X4, though only J~ = X~ + X2 + X3 was 
used because none of  the 20 subjects were able to formulate Task 4 as we 
intended it. 
5. Results and Discussion 
TABLE I 
Summary of Analysis of Variance 
Source of Variation Sum of squares Degrees of freedom Mean square F 
Between methods 41042 1 41042 11.95" 
Experimental error 61844 18 3435.78 
Total 102886 19 
* F, r99(l , 18) = 11.95, we obtain a significant F at the .01 level. 
Table 1 shows the results of one-way analysis of  variance of this data. It 
proves that the null hypothesis, EX c = EXT, has to be rejected at a .01 level 
of significance. This means that our improvement technique had a significant 
effect. While working with the children, we formed the "clinical" impression 
that those of  superior intelligence, energy, aptitude, from both groups T and 
C would do equally well and better than those of  lesser "mathematical  
abilities". Some of  the children rated lowest in "mathematical  abili ty" by 
their teachers, however, did surprisingly well on the test. It is those children 
for whom the improvement method appears to have made the greatest 
difference. 
For  our test to be a good assessment instrument, it should have high 
reliability. To measure its reliability requires a far larger sample than the 20 
children tested here. This has yet to be done. This experiment was intended 
primarily as a pilot, to guide our conceptualization and give us experience in 
designing a test and improvement technique. It has served this purpose by 
supporting the claim that "hypotheses" have psychological reality and that 
problem-recognition and formulation can be learned by exposing children to 
inquiry-provoking situations where they have to form hypotheses. 
The experimental subjects who were exposed to our improvemen t 
procedure did significantly better on the test than the subjects in the control 
group primilarily because the improvement procedure provided exposure to 
opportunities for original inquiry. This stimulated the subjects to form 
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general hypotheses.  These led them to ask questions. The answers led to 
changes in weigh t , saliency, and to the formation of  new hypotheses.  This 
learned ability to form, pick and use general hypotheses  and specialize them 
to specific cases may have transferred to the test situation. It is very unlikely 
that memory  alone can account  for the higher score of  the experimental 
subjects, because the tasks on the test differed considerably from the tasks in 
the training sessions. 
Some additional findings emerged from our data. A simple test for 
association indicated that X1, X2 and X3 were not  statistically independent.  
That is, the conditional probabil i ty that a subject does well on task 1 
(arithmetic on rate × distance) given that he did well on Task 3 (arithmetic 
on price × quanti ty)  is higher than it is, given that he did poorly on Task 3. 
We expected that for the 10 trained children, X1 would be correlated 
with X3, if  not  also )(2, though for the control group we expected lower 
correlation between X1 and X3, because Tasks 1 and 3 were formally 
identical. The correlations among X1T, X2T and X3T give additional 
support  to the claim that general hypotheses,  which can be specialized to 
both  Task 1 and Task 3, for example, were formed. 
The hypotheses EX1T = EX2T = EX3T and EX1c = EX2c = EX 3 c 
were accepted at the .01 level by means of  an analysis of  variance. This 
indicates that the 3 items on the test were approximately equivalent, though 
variance should also be taken into account. 
That none of  the 20 subjects were able to recognize and formulate Task 
4 (algebra) within the time limit may be due to the nature of  the task. It 
does not  necessarily indicate that 4th and 5th graders cannot formulate 
algebra problems. The idea of  creating sentences about  area and perimeter 
simply did not  occur to them. It is also curious that while most of  the 
children asked if the wire flame should form a "square",  none asked if it 
should be a "rectangle". Perhaps children must solve such algebra problems 
before they can recognize and formulate them. 
During the training sessions, some of  the children were able to form 
such algebra problems as "The product  of  two numbers is 35 and they differ 
by 2. What are they?".  They "saw" the answer rather than applied algebraic 
operations which, of  course, they had never encountered. But they could 
invent analogous problems, especially in concrete situations rather than such 
highly abstract arithmetic problems. 
Children on their own (e.g. during recess) can go to a playground (that 
they may not  have seen before) with ch i ldrennot  previously known to them 
and create (rather than just  follow) rules in inventing original games. A 
similar creative competence seems to be at work when children are en- 
couraged to inquire freely and to invent problem-statements and rules in 
tasks requiring mathematical thinking. Our observations of  the children 
confirm that this kind of  creative approach to mathematical thinking is more 
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reinforcing than the more conventional aim of making them proficient at 
manipulating mathematical symbols (competing with a computer). 
One of our motivations for studying problem-formulation in children 
was our prior experience with attempting to teach this to graduate students. 
We had '1 to help students of urban/regional planning (Kochen, 1972) learn 
mathematical thinking to pass a Ph.D. qualifying examination in analytics. 
Some of these students had exposure to 4th and 5th grade mathematics (but 
little more) decades ago, and had either forgotten or never learned it 
(perhaps because they hated it). A few seem never to have been exposed 
even to that. We observed that not only these, but even some of the best 
Ph.D. candidates in mathematics, had the greatest difficulty in picking and 
formulating problems by themselves. Even greater was the difficulty of 
encountering or sensing a real problem, which has a natural mathematical 
formulation, and recognizing it as denoted by the kind of mathematical 
story-problems that has been seen in textbooks, courses and even in 
seminars. Formulating a thesis problem is therefore a great hurdle for many 
graduate students. It is very hard to get them to learn this so late in their 
educational development. That is why we explored how easily children could 
learn to pick and formulate their own problems. 
If our view is sound that problem-formulation is the result of forming 
and using hypotheses by anything like the processes we suggest, then a 
further analysis plus experimental corroboration of this "representation 
theory" could lead to more systematically designed improvement (Church- 
man, 1972) and testing procedures. Variants of the experiments reported 
here should be repeated with larger samples from different populations and 
other tasks. More crucial experiments to lead to strong inferences about the 
psychological relevance of representation theory and its application to 
education are planned. 
6. Summary of Conclusions 
We cbnceptualized the process of recognizing and formulating real 
problems as mathematical story-problems statements. This is based on 
"representation theory," which holds that learners form, select, and use 
general hypotheses. To test an aspect of this theory, we developed a 
technique to elicit inquiry behavior in 4th and 5th graders. By exposure to 
question and hypothesis-formation, such as a variant of "Twenty Ques- 
tions," we expected the children to form general hypotheses on their own. 
11 We did prepare a sequence of graded exercises to help them translate in a step-by-step 
procedure, preformulated mathematical story problems into mathematical formulations. 
Some of these problem-statements contained fewer givens than necessary to solve the 
problem; some contained more. In some the givens were contradictory. 
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This was tested by the speed with which they asked questions indicative of 
such hypotheses. A controlled experiment with 20 children showed that 10 
who were exposed to our technique aimed at improving problem-recognition 
and formulation did significantly better than the 10 children who were not 
exposed to this. 
This finding shows that problem formulation can be learned. This is 
important because it offers a feasible remedy for the situation where people 
are far better at solving problems that were preformulated for them than 
they are at recognizing and formulating problems on their own. 
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A p p e n d i x :  ( S a m p l e s  o f  t r e a t m e n t - p r o t o c o l s )  lz 
" T w e n t y  Q u e s t i o n s " -  A sample  game 
T: Okay,  we will p lay t w e n t y  ques t ions  again. I am going to t h i n k  of  some n u m b e r  and 
s ta r t ing  w i th  S1 we will go a r o u n d  the  table,  the  same way,  one at a t ime,  un t i l  each of  
you  has had  4 ques t ions  or one  of  you  gets the  answer.  R e m e m b e r  to keep eve ryone ' s  
ques t ions  and  the  answers  in  m i n d  - this  will help you  in achieving a so lu t ion .  A good 
de tec t ive  uses all the  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  no t  jus t  some of  it. I will help you  keep t rack  of  
some of  t he  i n f o r m a t i o n  by  wr i t ing  it on  the  b l ackboa rd .  
T: Okay.  I am t h i n k i n g  of  a n u m b e r  b e t w e e n  one  and  o n e - t h o u s a n d .  (T wri te  on  
b l ackboa rd :  is a n u m b e r  b e t w e e n  {1,2 . . . . . . . . . . .  1000 } T h e -  s tands  for  
the  h i d d e n  n u m b e r  t h a t  I w a n t  you  to  discover.)  
S: Is the  n u m b e r  a 3-digit n u m b e r ?  
T: Exce l l en t  ques t ion .  Yes i t  is. - - - is a 3-digit n u m b e r  
. . . .  is b e t w e e n  (100 ,  1 0 1 , .  . . . . . . . . . . .  9 9 9 }  
T h a t  was a great  ques t ion  as you  can  all see because  w i th  j u s t  one  ques t ion  we have 
e l imina ted  all n u m b e r s  f rom 1 to  99 and inc lud ing  99. We have also e l imina ted  1000,  
s ince this  is a 4-digit  n u m b e r .  
S: Do 2 n u m b e r s  repea t  in  it? 
T: Yes. G o o d  ques t ion .  - - - has r epea t ing  number s .  
S: Does the  n u m b e r  have a 2 in it? 
T: No. - - has no  2 's  in it. 
S: Is the  n u m b e r  a r o u n d  the  middle?  
T: I can no t  answer  a ques t ion  like t h a t  unless y o u  make  clear wha t  ' °midd le"  is. 
S: 500? 
T: Do y o u  m e a n  is it 500? Be still more  specific. 
S: Is it m o r e ' t h a n  500? 
T: Yes. T h a t  is a very  good ques t ion  because  now  we have e l imina ted  all n u m b e r s  be low 
500 and  inc lud ing  500,  since greater  t han  500 means  t h a t  500  is no t  inc luded .  By the  
way,  if m y  answer  had  been  NO, t ha t  the  h i d d e n  n u m b e r  was no t  more  t h a n  500 t h e n  
you  still would  have good i n f o r m a t i on .  This is because  y o u  would  t hen  k n o w  tha t  the  
n u m b e r  could  be 500 and  any  n u m b e r  be low 500.  
- - - is a n u m b e r  larger t h a n  500 
S: Are  the re  3 n u m b e r s  all t he  same? 
12 The  t r e a t m e n t  g roup  was b r o k e n  i~to 2 equal  groups of  five ch i ld ren  in each group to 
a l low T to supervise and  give m a x i m u m  a t t e n t i o n  to  each child.  Ques t ion-ask ing  was 
encouraged  and  good ques t ions  were posi t ively  r e in fo rced  w i t h  r emarks  f rom T. 
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T: Good.  Yes. Now wha t  does this  tell us__about the  possibi l i ty?  What  n u m b e r  in  the  500s,  
600s,  700,  800,  and  900s,  c a n  be the  same? 
- - - is 5 5 5 , 6 6 6 ,  7 7 7 , 8 8 8 , 9 9 9  
S: Are  all t he  n u m b e r s  even? 
T: What  do y o u  m e a n  by  even? 
S: l ike 4, 6, 8. 
T: No.  so - - - is an odd  n u m b e r ;  555 or 777 or  999.  
S: Is ~t 777? 
T: No. - - - is e i ther  555 or  999.  
S: 999?  
T: Yes. 
Examples of "story-problems" children formulated during treatment 
The weigh t  of  2 shoes  is equal  to  t he  weight  of  1 ball  + 20 grams.  The  weight  of  1 shoe 
is equal  to  - -  
A man  has 8 cars and  3 engines.  How m a n y  ways can he  c o m b i n e  the  cars and 
engines  w i t h o u t  do ing  it  twice? 
If  the  weight  of  2 shoes  is equal  to 10 pounds ,  h o w  m u c h  is the  weight  of  one shoe 
if  b o t h  shoes  weigh the  same? 
Joe  weighs 114 p o u n d s  and  this  is 3 t imes  wha t  Je r ry  weighs. Wha t  is the  weight  of  
Jer ry?  
Nine  innings  in a basebal l  game. 24 people  ate 3 ho t  dogs each in each  inning.  Each  
ho t  dog cost  10c, How m u c h  m o n e y  was spen t?  
If  2 /4  of  the  apples  are r o t t e n  and  112 are green,  and  the re  are 10 apples,  h o w  m a n y  
are r o t t e n ?  
A br ick  on  one  scale weighs 10 pounds  and  you  have to ba lance  it on  the  scale. 
Wha t  br icks  would  y ou  use if  you  have 5, 4, 8, 2, and  1 p o u n d  br icks?  
If  y o u  had  4 sheep and  you  called a tail a leg, h o w  m a n y  legs would  you  have? 
